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This	 paper	 studies	 the	 relation	 between	 Islam	 and	 economic	 development	 from	 a	
juridico-philosophical	perspective.	A	fresh	review	of	this	issue	is	timely	because	of	the	
ongoing	 laggardness	of	Arab	and	Muslim	economies	due	 to	decades	of	Pareto-inferior	
poverty	 traps.	 We	 disentangle	 the	 viewpoints	 on	 the	 Islamic-economic	 nexus	 and	
determine	that	the	backwardness	of	Muslim	countries’	economies	is	due	to	the	retrograde	
outlook	of	the	jurists	(fuqahāʾ).	Flawed	jurisprudential	reasoning	is	instrumental	in	the	
paucity	 of	 financial	 instruments,	 markets,	 and	 institutional	 development.	 We	 also	
scrutinise	the	jurists’	co-option	by	the	ruling	elite,	which	legitimises	the	elite’s	autocracy.	
















Africa	 (MENA)	 highlights	 the	 frustration	 of	 the	 masses	 at	 decades,	 possibly	 even	
centuries,	 of	 economic,	 political,	 and	 social	 underdevelopment.	 This	
underdevelopment	 is	 not	 peculiar	 to	 these	 Arab	 states;	 it	 reverberates	 generally	
around	the	Muslim	world.	Given	the	relative	economic	superiority	of	the	Muslim	world	
over	Europe	for	much	of	the	pre-modern	age,	the	ongoing	uprisings	bring	to	the	fore	
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the	 criticality	 of	 a	 deeper	 understanding	 of	 Islam	 for	 improving	 economic	





juridico-philosophical	 perspective.	 The	 literature	 widely	 accepts	 the	 crucial	 role	 that	
institutions	have	historically	played	 in	economic	development.2	Institutional	 evolution	
(or	stagnation)	over	time	can	explain	how	businesses	flourish	(or	wither	away)	due	to	
decreasing	 (or	 increasing)	 transaction	 costs.	 This	 evolution	 can	 favourably	 (or	
unfavourably)	affect	society.	Here	we	elaborate	on	how	religious	beliefs	are	contingent	
on	 how	 scholars	 (culamāʾ)	 interpret	 the	 scriptures	 of	 the	 Qurʾan	 and	 Sunna	 –	 the	











has	 led	 to	 a	 failure	 to	 establish	 institutions	 that	 protect	 these	 rights	 and	 so	 advance	
financial	 development. 6 ,	 7 	Historically,	 this	 misunderstanding	 has	 also	 led	 jurists	 to	
condone,	 and	 at	 times	 even	 to	 legitimise,	 the	 rent-seeking	 practices	 of	monarchs	 and	






by	 author-jurists	 (i.e.,	 scholars	 whose	 activity	 involved	 writing	 legal	 treatises	 and	 expanded	
commentaries).	After	the	crystallisation	of	Islamic	law	into	the	major	schools	of	thought,	it	is	almost	
impossible	 to	 find	 legal	opinions	 in	 the	 law	pertaining	 to	 financial	 transactions	diverging	 from	the	
views	expressed	 in	 the	 literature	of	 the	classical	age.	This	 is	why	our	generalised	reference	 to	 the	
jurists,	treating	them	as	a	monolithic	group,	is	in	our	opinion	justified.	For	more	on	the	legal	specialists,	
see	W.	Hallaq,	Introduction	to	Islamic	Law	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2009).	




















is	 conducted.	 An	 overhaul	 of	 educational	 institutions,	 which	 currently	 serve	 only	 to	
perpetuate	intellectual	stagnation,	could	facilitate	this	refinement.	This	overhaul	needs	to	
be	followed	by	the	structuring	of	institutions	to	promote	property	rights	and	to	encourage	








2	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Despite	 representing	 approximately	 21	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 world’s	 population,	 Muslim	
countries	lag	far	behind	other	nations	in	terms	of	development,	contributing	a	mere	8	per	
cent	 of	 the	 world’s	 Gross	 National	 Product	 (GNP).	 This	 reiterates	 the	 poor	 results	









that	hinges	on	 inefficient	 forms	of	intervention	and	redistribution	and	that	 is	 financed	
through	 external	windfalls.14	Chaney	 attributes	 the	 lack	 of	 democracy	 in	 parts	 of	 the	
                                               
8		 See	also	Pryor,	supra	note	6	at	1815-1835;	M.Coşgel,	T.	Miceli	&	R.	Ahmed,	 ‘Law,	 state	power	and	




more	conducive	 to	capitalism,	 thus	 inducing	growth.	One	 is	 that	 the	 religion	encourages	economic	
















Muslim	world	 to	 its	 conquest	 by	 the	 Arab	 armies	 following	 the	 death	 of	 the	 Prophet	
Muhammad.15	This	 impacted	 the	 conquered	 societies	 for	 centuries,	 eventually	 turning	
them	into	autocratic	states.16,	17	
According	 to	 several	 studies	 (described	 below),	 the	 underdevelopment	 of	 the	
Muslim	world	is	not	a	recent	phenomenon;	rather,	it	stretches	back	as	far	as	the	Middle	
Ages.	Also,	scholars	have	attributed	it	to	a	variety	of	internal	systemic	problems,	linked	





of	 Kuran’s	 thesis	 is	 that	 a	 developed	 financial	 system	 contributes	 significantly	 to	 a	
nation’s	growth.	We	agree	with	Kuran	that	financial	systems	play	a	vital	role	in	advancing	
intermediation	by	mitigating	market	frictions,	facilitating	efficient	investment	decisions,	
allocating	 scarce	 capital,	 and	 transmitting	 financial	 transactions.	 This	 role	 in	 turn	




of	 orthodoxy.	 Certainly,	 a	 body	 of	 evidence	 shows	 that	 religious	 constraints,	 amongst	
other	 factors,	 form	 the	 backdrop	 of	 inertia	 in	 commercial	organisations.	 Shatzmiller’s	
study	 is	 representative	 of	 this	 theme.	 The	 study	 contrasts	 the	 concentration	 of	
occupations	stemming	from	commerce	(private	commercial	enterprises)	with	that	of	the	
bureaucracy	 and	 the	 military	 (executive)	 and	 the	 education	 and	 legal	 (including	
religious)	 sectors	 in	Arab-Islamic	 regions	 during	 two	 consecutive	 eras:	701-1100	 and	




perspectives	 respectively,	 while	 Malik	 and	 Awadallah	 (supra	 note	 14)	 amalgamate	 these	 two	
perspectives.	The	aim	of	our	paper,	however,	is	radically	different	from	that	of	the	above	studies.	We	
focus	on	the	errors	of	the	de	facto	religious	authorities	(fuqahāʿ),	who	made	the	Muslim	world	submit	






itself	 (against	 that	 of	 the	 conquering	 or	 colonizing	 one)	with	 a	 bang’.	 There	 are	also	 examples	 of	




‘lack	 of	 accountability’	 emerging	 from	 an	 absence	 of	 taxation.	 That	 is,	 citizens	 are	 denied	
representation	when	they	are	not	taxed.	S.P.	Huntington,	The	Third	Wave:	Democratization	in	the	Late	
Twentieth	Century	(Norman,	OK:	University	of	Oklahoma	Press,	1991).		
18		 T.	 Kuran,	 ‘Why	 the	 Middle	 East	 is	 economically	 underdeveloped:	 Historical	 mechanisms	 of	
institutional	stagnation’,	Journal	of	Economic	Perspectives	18	(2004):	71-90;	T.	Kuran,	‘The	logic	of	
financial	 westernization	 in	 the	 Middle	 East’,	 Journal	 of	 Economic	 Behavior	 and	 Organization	 56	
(2005):	 593-615;	 T.	 Kuran,	 The	 Long	 Divergence:	 How	 Islamic	 Law	 Held	 Back	 the	 Middle	 East	
(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	2011).	






1101-1500.20	In	 the	 first	period,	 the	 formative	period	of	 Islamic	 law,	 the	Arab-Islamic	
world	had	233	distinct	commercial	occupations,	including	sellers,	middlemen,	brokers,	
weighers,	appraisers,	and	financiers.	In	the	second	period,	the	number	of	occupations	was	
220,	 roughly	 the	 same	(see	Figure	1).	Remarkably,	 the	number	of	unique	commercial	
occupations	in	the	bureaucracy	and	military	tripled,	and	the	number	of	educational,	legal,	












commercial	 occupations	 was	 relatively	 low.	 Whereas	 more	 than	 four-fifths	 of	 all	
occupations	in	the	bureaucracy,	military,	education,	law,	and	religion	were	new,	only	half	
of	 the	 commercial	 occupations	 were	 so	 (see	 Table	 1).	 According	 to	 Kuran,	 ‘[This]	
relatively	 low	 occupational	 turnover	 in	 private	 commerce	 is	 consistent	 with	 loss	 of	
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There	 are	 two	 broad	 theories	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 Islam	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 economic	














Islamic	 inheritance	 system	 ‘hindered	 capital	 accumulation’;	 the	 waqf	 (charitable	
endowment)	 system	 ‘inhibited	 the	 pooling	 of	 resources’	 by	 other	 financial	
intermediaries;	and	the	Islamic	legal	system’s	aversion	to	the	concept	of	legal	personhood	
‘enfeebled	 private	 organisations’. 23 	Some	 of	 these	 institutions	 became	 sources	 of	
inefficiency.	 Thus,	 ‘if	 the	 impetus	 for	 financial	 modernization	 ultimately	 came	 from	
abroad,	the	fundamental	reason	is	that	Islam’s	traditional	institutions	blocked	indigenous	
paths	to	financial	development’.24	
Balla	 and	 Johnson	 argue	 that	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 eventually	 collapsed	 in	 the	
nineteenth	 century	because	property	 rights	had	not	been	 institutionalised.25	Although	
the	Christian-French	and	Muslim-Ottoman	fiscal	institutions	faced	similar	fiscal	crises	in	
the	early	seventeenth	century,	uncertain	property	rights	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	led	to	
different	 institutional	 outcomes.	 In	 France,	 tax	 collectors	 successfully	 restrained	 the	
monarch	from	imposing	collective-action	costs.	In	contrast,	tax	collectors	in	the	Ottoman	
Empire	 faced	excessive	 transaction	 costs	 in	organising	 the	 same.	Thus	 fiscal	 contracts	
were	more	 secure	 in	 France	 than	 in	 the	 latter.	 This	 security	 explains	why	 Christian-







approach	 involves	 a	 feedback	 mechanism	 where	 improving	 economic	 conditions	 in	
Europe	 led	 to	 the	 relaxation	 of	 interest	 restrictions,	 simultaneously	 diminishing	 the	


















Chapra	 traces	 the	 degeneration	 of	 the	 Muslim	 world	 to	 the	 political	 illegitimacy	 of	










touch	with	 the	 rapidly	 changing	 environment.	 Consequently,	 discourse	 in	 the	 field	 of	
jurisprudence	suffered	and	lacked	the	dynamism	it	had	enjoyed	in	earlier	centuries.30	
Malik	 associates	 the	 degeneration	 of	 the	Muslim	world	with	 the	 evolution	of	 its	








ruling	 elite	 and	 the	 religious	 establishment.	 His	 theoretical	 result,	 however,	 deviates	 from	
contemporary	real-world	practice.	This	is	because	the	co-option	of	the	religious	establishment	by	the	
political	 elite,	 especially	 in	 the	 economically	 well-off	 Arabian	 Gulf	 countries,	 should	 result	 in	 the	
decline	of	‘Islamic’	banking	services.	The	opposite	result	(i.e.,	an	upsurge	in	demand	for	these	services	
and	 the	 conscious	 decision	 by	 established	Western	 banks	 to	 expand	 their	 repertoire	 of	 services)	
contrasts	 starkly	with	 the	prognosis	of	Rubin.	 J.	Rubin,	 ‘Institutions,	 the	 rise	of	commerce	and	 the	





30		 Ibid.	 Our	 major	 disagreement	 with	 Chapra’s	 analysis	 is	 that	 he	 absolves	 the	 jurists	 from	 blame.	






















of	 commerce,	 coercion	and	colonisation’.	European	 firms	 invented	new	organisational	
forms	and	financing	mechanisms	against	a	backdrop	of	interstate	competition,	overseas	
expansion,	 and	 long-distance	 trade,	 ultimately	 manifesting	 in	 the	 Western	 corporate	
innovations	 of	 impersonal	 and	 permanently	 lived	 organisations,	 the	 separation	 of	
ownership	 and	 control,	 and	 the	 mobilisation	 of	 long-term	 capital	 through	 joint-stock	
companies.	Many	of	these	legal	and	corporate	innovations	were	partly	a	response	to	the	
needs	of	war-making	states	and	overseas	commercial	ventures.	
In	 this	 paper,	we	 contribute	 to	 the	 discourse	around	 Islam	 and	 development	 by	
building	on	 the	work	of	Timur	Kuran	and	providing	an	 important	 corrective	 to	 it.	We	
investigate	a	factor	hitherto	unexplored	in	the	academic	literature:	how	jurisprudential	
interpretation	 (ijtihād)	has	 shaped	 the	present	economies	of	Muslim	states.	This	 is	 in	
conformity	 with	 the	 view	 of	 political	 scientist	 Michael	 Fish,	 who	 states	 that	 ‘it	 is	 as	
dubious	 to	 try	 to	 locate	 the	 source	of	 social	practice	and	order	 in	scripture	 in	 Islamic	
settings	as	it	is	to	try	to	locate	them	there	in	Christian	and	Jewish	settings,	because	as	with	
all	 holy	 injunctions	 based	 on	 sacred	 text,	 interpretive	 traditions	 are	 powerful	 and	
ultimately	determine	practice’.34		
We	evaluate	the	role	of	the	pre-eminent	interpreters	of	Islam,	namely	the	Muslim	
jurists	 (fuqahāʾ),	 in	 impeding	 institutional	 change.	We	 focus	on	 their	 interpretation	of	
ribā,	arguing	that	 their	 failure	to	recognise	the	Qur'anic	ban	on	ribā	as	one	protecting	
property	 rights	 has	 led	 to	 flawed	 rationalisations	 that	miss	 the	Divine	 injunction	 and	
contributes	 to	 a	 weakened	 institutional	 framework	 that	 caves	 in	 to	 rent-seeking	
autocrats.35	
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Muhammad	Iqbal,	the	well-known	poet-philosopher	of	the	Indo-Pak	subcontinent,	
describes	 ijtihād	 as	 the	 elixir	 of	Muslim	 legal	 thought.	 For	 him,	 although	 the	 ultimate	
spiritual	basis	of	all	life	is	‘eternal	and	reveals	itself	in	variety	and	change,	that	is,	in	an	
ever	 dynamic	 universe’, 36 	there	 must	 also	 be	 a	 mechanism	 that	 accommodates	 for	
movement	 and	 change,	which	 are	 so	 characteristic	of	 the	human	 experience.	 The	 key	
principle	 that	 allows	 for	 adaption	 in	 Islam	 is	 ijtihād.	 Ijtihād	 means	 ‘to	 exert’	 in	 the	
terminology	of	Islamic	legal	theory.	Kamali	describes	it	as	‘the	total	expenditure	of	effort	
by	 a	mujtahid	 (capable	 scholar)	 to	 infer	with	a	 degree	 of	 probability	 the	 rules	 of	 the	
                                               














processes’;	 thus,	 in	 Kamali’s	 new	 conceptualisation,	 ijtihād	 is	 a	 ‘creative	 and	
comprehensive	 intellectual	 effort	 by	 qualified	 individuals	 and	 groups	 to	 derive	 the	
juridical	 ruling	 on	 a	 given	 issue	 from	 the	 sources	 of	 Sharī‘ah	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
prevailing	 circumstances	 of	 society’. 38 	The	 idea	 is	 most	 clearly	 adumbrated	 in	 the	
Prophetic	tradition	(ḥadīth):	‘when	a	judge	gives	a	decision,	having	tried	his	best	to	decide	
correctly	and	 is	right,	 there	are	two	rewards	 for	him;	and	 if	he	gives	a	 judgment	after	
having	tried	his	best	(to	arrive	at	a	correct	decision)	but	erred,	there	is	one	reward	for	
him’. 39 	Moreover,	 the	 traditions	 in	 which	 the	 Prophet	 is	 reported	 to	 have	 openly	
encouraged	independent	thought,	or	tacitly	approved	of	it,	are	too	numerous	to	ignore.	
His	 Companions,	 both	 during	 his	 lifetime	 and	 after	 his	 death,	 applied	 their	 reason	 to	
problems	in	a	relatively	unencumbered	way.		
However,	 the	 first	 significant	 political	 expansion	 of	 Islam	 (in	 the	 eight	 century)	





complete	 authority	 in	 legislation,	which	 is	 practically	 confined	 to	 the	 founders	 of	 the	
schools;	relative	authority,	which	is	to	be	exercised	within	the	limits	of	a	particular	school;	
and	special	authority,	which	relates	to	the	determination	of	the	law	that	is	applicable	to	a	
particular	 case	 unexplored	 by	 the	 founders.40 	Since	 Sunni	 orthodoxy	 established	 the	




large	 part	 due	 to	 the	 jurist	 and	 legal	 theoretician	 al-Shāficī	 (d.	 820),	 whose	 efforts	
circumscribed	 the	unfettered	use	of	opinion.41	A	 rudimentary	and	almost	unconscious	
analogical	method	was	always	present	in	Islam.	When	jurists	were	faced	with	a	new,	or	
refined,	 complex	 issue,	 they	 referred	 either	 to	 a	 verse	 in	 the	 Qur’an,	 or	 to	 a	 general	
principle,	or	to	a	specific	case	in	the	practice	of	the	Prophet	or	the	early	Muslims	(Sunna).	
But	in	both	the	choice	of	the	model	and	the	discernment	of	the	point	of	resemblance,	the	
jurists	 had	 almost	 unbridled	 liberty	 in	 their	 decision-making,	 a	 liberty	 that	 produced	
results	that	ranged	from	sound	analogy	to	almost	complete	arbitrariness.	






Shamsy,	 ‘The	 social	 construction	 of	 orthodoxy’,	 in	 T.	Winter	 (ed.),	 The	 Cambridge	 Companion	 to	
Classical	Islamic	Theology	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006),	97-118.	
41		 For	 this	 development,	 see	 F.	 Rahman,	 Islam	 and	 Modernity:	 Transformation	 of	 an	 Intellectual	
Tradition	(Chicago,	IL:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2002).	On	al-Shāficī’s	role	in	the	early	development	
of	Muslim	legal	theory,	see	J.	Schacht,	The	Origins	of	Muhammadan	Jurisprudence	(Oxford:	Clarendon,	








used,	 as	 it	 was	 a	 casualty	 of	 the	 sustained	 attempt	 of	mainly	 Shāficī	 jurists	 to	 create	
analytical	consistency	and	standardise	the	law.42	The	ratiocination	of	 jurists,	with	very	
few	exceptions,	thereafter	revolved	around	the	effective	cause	(cilla)	of	an	existing	legal	
judgment	 rather	 than	constituting	an	applied	attempt	 to	extend	 the	 law	based	on	 the	
objectives	(maqāṣid)	of	Sharīca	or	on	economic	rationale	(ḥikma).	The	 jurists	believed	
that	effective	cause	was	an	objective	attribute	that	did	not	vary	from	person	to	person	or	
change	with	 circumstances.	 It	was	 therefore	deemed	 the	most	 suitable	 foundation	 for	
developing	the	law.43	
In	many	legal	cases,	this	textualistic	approach	to	legal	reasoning	resulted	in	glaring	
errors.44	For	example,	 jurists	 failed	to	establish	the	correct	rationale	 for	 the	 injunction	
pertaining	 to	 barter	 (i.e.,	 the	 inequitable	 spot	 exchanges	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 Islamic	
literature	as	ribā	al-faḍl).	Instead,	they	determined	the	ratio	legis	as	an	attribute	intrinsic	
to	 the	 specific	 commodities	 stated	 in	 the	 well-known	 tradition	 (ḥadīth).	 This	









priced	 to	avoid	 financial	 repression	as	well	 as	negative	 leverage;	 it	 alleviates	 financial	
fragility;	and	it	mitigates	the	financial	exclusion	of	the	underprivileged.47	
The	 first	 constraint	 reinforces	 economic	 sustainability,	 the	 second	 constraint	
alleviates	a	financial	crisis,	and	the	third	constraint	brings	about	the	cohesion	of	disparate	
social	classes.	This	cohesion	mitigates	civil	strife	and	builds	a	harmonious	society.	These	
issues	 are	 especially	 important	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 recent	 sub-prime	 crisis. 48	
Understanding	 the	 rationale	 behind	 the	 injunction	 of	 ribā	 al-nasīʾah	 is	 critical	 for	
economic	development	and	thus	 for	advancing	growth.	The	business	history	literature	
especially	illustrates	how	the	jurists’	misunderstanding	of	the	third	constraint	has	led	to	
the	 underdevelopment	 of	 institutions	 that	 might	 have	 helped	 the	 poor	 and	
underprivileged	 in	 the	Muslim	world.49	The	 jurists	made	 exceptions	 for	 commutative	
                                               
42		 Inductive	 reasoning	 did	 find	 continued	 life,	 to	 some	 degree,	 in	 the	 doctrine	 of	 public	 interest	
(maṣlaḥa),	and	equity	(istiḥsān).	For	more	on	these	two	juristic	tools,	see	M.H.	Kamali,	Principles	of	
Islamic	Jurisprudence	(Cambridge:	The	Islamic	Texts	Society	2003),	275-278.	
























                                               









	 - ḍl	-	the	hidden	ribā	 	 - h	-	the	evident	ribā	
	 	 	
Relates	to	spot	exchanges		 Relates	to	deferred	exchanges	
	 	 	 	
Excess	in	exchange	without	an	
equivalent	counter	value	
Delay	 in	 payments	 with	 an	 increase	
above	 the	 original	 amount	 at	 the	
settlement	 date;	 or	 vice	 versa	 (i.e.,	
lowering	 the	 debt	 in	 return	 for	 an	
accelerated	payment)	




























































In	 general,	 the	 ribā	 prohibition	 delineates	 protection	 of	 rights	 of	 both	
contracting	 parties.	 This	 is	 retrospective	 of	 the	 Sharīca	 that	 accords	























	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
The	incoherent	jurisprudential	interpretation	(ijtihād)	manifests	itself	in	Islamic	banking	








conformity)	 or	qubḥ	 (unseemliness	 or	 deformity).	 These	 qualities,	 according	 to	most	
theologians	and	 jurists,	 cannot	be	known	by	 reason	or	natural	 law	–	 they	 can	only	be	
known	by	Divine	revelation.52	This	logic	holds	true	whatever	the	action,	and	even	when	
an	 action	 is	 self-evidently	 a	 crime	 (e.g.,	 murder	 or	 theft).	 Anderson	 asserts	 that	 the	
dominant	theological	school	in	Islamic	history	(i.e.,	the	Ashcarīs)	‘firmly	denied	that	man’s	
reason	is	competent	to	apprehend	the	differences	between	virtue	and	vice,	or	even	that	






law	 or	 human	 positive	 law.	 Furthermore,	 since	 Islamic	 law	 very	 early	 in	 its	 history	
became	a	static	edifice	of	strict	laws,	a	cleavage	between	theory	and	practice	arose.	And	
although	 customary	 law	 had	 no	 official	 locus	 standi	 in	 jurisprudence,	 the	 fact	 is	 that	







‘The	 earliest	 ḥiyal	 (ruses)	 were	 merely	 simple	 evasions	 of	 irksome	 prohibitions	 by	





end	 is	 achieved	 by	 lawful	 means,	 from	 those	 that	 are	 ‘forbidden’,	 which	 he	 declares	
invalid.		
                                               
51		 F.	 Khan,	 ‘How	 “Islamic”	 is	 Islamic	 Banking?’,	 Journal	 of	 Economic	 Behavior	 and	 Organization	 76	
(2010):	818.	


















interest-bearing	 loan	 (i.e.,	 a	 banking	 murābaḥa).	 This	 ruse	 arose	 because	 jurists,	
















payment	plans’.59	That	 is,	credit	sales	 fundamentally	enhance	the	demand	for	goods	 in	
the	real	sector	of	the	economy	because	they	are	contingent	on	the	elasticity	of	demand	of	
the	asset	being	sold.60		





adverse	 selection,	moral	hazard,	 and	 the	agency	 cost	of	debt	due	 to	 the	 collateralised	
nature	of	the	debt.61	
The	 legitimisation	of	 the	banking	murābaḥa	by	the	 jurists	has	 led	to	yet	another	








based	on	 implementing	medieval	 (and	often	 inefficient)	 Islamic	 financial	 instruments,	
                                               
58		 Al-Zuhayli,	supra	note	50	at	26-54.	













represents	 nothing	 less	 than	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 religious	 establishment	 to	 engage	 in	
jurisprudential	interpretation	(ijtihād).	This	issue	is	reiterated	in	Ebrahim	and	Rahman,	
who	 find	 that	 the	 medieval	 Islamic	 forward	 sale	 is	 less	 efficient	 than	 conventional	
futures.63	
	
	 s 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
When	the	Qur’anic	 imperative	outlawing	ribā	(i.e.,	 the	charging	of	 interest	on	 loans	as	
deduced	by	the	jurists)	was	first	revealed	in	the	final	years	of	the	Prophet	Muhammad’s	
mission,	it	was	nothing	short	of	a	command	to	the	believing	Muslim	to	act	with	loving	
kindness	 towards	 his	 fellow	human	beings.	 The	Qur’an	 (2:276)	 in	 particular	 issued	 a	
command	 to	 adhere	 to	 the	 virtues	 of	 cooperation	 and	mutual	 support	 via	 charitable	
lending.64	Muslim	creditors	are	entreated	to	lend	without	interest,	even	if	vulnerable	to	






















years	 ago,	 remained	 a	 static	 edifice,	 as	 its	 formulators	 failed	 to	 keep	 pace	 with	 the	
changing	intellectual	and	socio-economic	environment.	As	Robinson	explains:	
	
Religious	 authority,	 and	 the	 capacity	 to	 produce	 authoritative	 interpretation,	
derived	from	the	Quran	and	the	life	of	the	Prophet,	lay	with	the	'ulamā.	They	were	
the	recipients	of	the	traditions	of	Islamic	scholarship	which	had	built	up	through	
time.	 They	 were	 proud	 of	 the	 many	 ijāzahs	 [authorisations]	 they	 possessed,	
permitting	them	to	transmit	the	great	scholarly	works	of	the	past.	They	relied	on	
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form	of	 law	relevant	 to	 the	problems	of	 their	 time.	Throughout	 they	 strove	 to	
prevent	 others	 muscling	 in	 on	 their	 monopoly,	 whether	 they	 were	 sufis	 or	
sultans.66	
	







The	 'ulamā	 in	 the	 1950s	 had	 weather-affected,	 dried	 skin	 hands	 and	 humble	
clothing,	 sitting	 in	 the	 cold,	 teaching	 on	 the	 ground	 of	 mosques	 in	 Cairo,	
Damascus,	Aleppo	and	Baghdad,	are	now	replaced	with	soft-living	 'ulamā	who	








power	 after	 more	 than	 a	 century	 of	 having	 had	 virtually	 no	 role	 to	 play	 except	 in	
judgments	related	to	personal	status	law	and	ritual	practice.70	
The	 jurists’	errors	also	did	not	come	to	light	sooner	because	the	various	schools,	
together	 with	 their	 respective	 doctrines	 in	 Islam,	 sedimented,	 which	 to	 some	 extent	
stifled	critical	thinking	(insofar	as	Muslims	were	exhorted	to	think	strictly	in	line	with	
their	school	of	thought).	This	process	has	also	led	to	what	Al-Alwani	describes	as	a	‘crisis	
in	 fiqh	 (jurisprudence)’,	 driven	 by	 an	 agglomeration	 of	 errors	 in	 what	 is	 a	 static	


























in	 establishing	 institutions	 that	 might	 protect	 property	 rights	 and	 foster	 good	
governance,	and	it	has	contributed	to	Muslim	countries,	with	little	power	to	control	their	
own	destiny,	being	subjugated	either	by	colonial	masters	or	by	indigenous	dictatorships.	
A	 third	 reason,	 advanced	 by	 the	 late	 M.	 Amir	 Ali,	 attributes	 the	 decline	 in	 the	
scientific	 leadership	 of	 the	 Muslim	 world	 to	 the	 narrow	 interpretation	 of	 religious	













world’s	most	disgraced	people	due	 to	 their	backwardness,	 illiteracy,	poverty	


















narrow	 elite	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 majority.75 	Throughout	 Muslim	 history,	 countless	
                                               












highly	 influential	 jurists	 have	 legitimised	 monarchs	 and	 autocrats’	 expropriating	
wealth.76	This	contrasts	with	the	vital	check	many	early	Islamic	jurists	provided	on	rulers’	
power.77	Over	time,	however,	due	to	reforms,	the	ruling	class	has	integrated	the	jurists	
into	 its	 regimes,	 allowing	 unbridled	 and	 unchecked	 executive	 power	 to	 be	 the	 norm.	
Henceforth,	 Islamic	law	has	been	 less	of	a	 force	 for	legitimate	rule	and	has	specialised	





In	 addition	 to	 expropriating	 wealth,	 various	 monarchs	 and	 autocrats	 have	 also	






exceptions,	 the	 private	 sector	 is	 generally	 weak	 and	 dependent	 on	 state	
patronage;	success	in	it	is	determined	more	on	patronage	than	entrepreneurship.	
With	 the	 public	 sector	 acting	 as	 the	main	 avenue	 for	 job	 creation,	 the	 region	
suffers	 from	a	precarious	employment	 strategy	and	 is	 left	unprepared	 to	deal	
with	demographic	pressures.79	
	
Thus	 jurists	 at	 various	 points	 in	 history	 have	 supported	 the	 ruling	 elite	 by	










Third,	 in	 terms	 of	 modern	 economies,	 financial	 innovations,	 which	 give	 rise	 to	
efficient	organisational	forms	that	deliver	goods	to	their	customers	at	competitive	rates,	
have	 failed	 to	 keep	 pace	 in	 the	 Muslim	 world.	 This	 failure	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 not	
undertaking	 a	 dynamic	 jurisprudential	 interpretation	 (ijtihād),	 with	 profound	
ramifications.	It	has	impacted	on	the	competitiveness	of	Muslim	entrepreneurship	and	
has	 led	to	a	 failure	to	establish	 financial	institutions	that	might	promote	the	economic	
interests	of	the	poor	and	underprivileged,	as	encouraged	in	the	Qur'an.83	














inferior	 equilibria	 that	 have	 been	 devastating	 for	 the	Muslim	world.	For	 example,	 the	
economic	 and	 intellectual	 decline,	 along	with	 a	 repressed	majority,	made	 the	Muslim	
countries	vulnerable	to	colonisation	by	European	countries.	The	economic	wedge	of	the	
colonies	widened	partly	due	to	‘institutional	reversal’	by	the	colonial	masters.84	That	is,	





Overall,	 colonialism	not	 only	 hindered	modernization	 efforts	 through	military	







their	 flawed	 interpretation	 (ijtihād),	 and	 their	 co-option	 by	 the	 ruling	 elite.	 Given	 the	
above,	 will	 a	 real	 Islamic	 financial	 architecture	 (accompanied	 by	 political	 reforms)	
reverse	 centuries	 of	 underdevelopment	 in	 the	 Muslim	 world?	 Our	 response	 to	 this,	








Empirical	studies	show	a	 link	between	a	 strong	 legal	 system	and	high	 corporate	
valuations,	corporate	finance,	and	the	efficiency	of	capital	allocations.88	That	is,	countries	
with	 laws	 that	more	effectively	protect	 investors	 tend	 to	encourage	 shareholders	and	
creditors	 to	 invest	 in	 firms,	 thereby	 driving	 up	 the	 price	 of	 corporate	 securities	 and	
decreasing	the	cost	of	capital.	
Second,	 financial	 innovations	 should	 yield	 organisational	 forms	 that	 efficiently	
support	the	delivery	of	the	products	that	their	customers	demand	at	the	lowest	price	by	






















limit	 the	 power	 holder’s	 ability	 to	 extricate	 economic	 surplus	 from	 the	 remaining	
members	of	society.	
Third,	a	development	strategy	for	the	Muslim	world	that	dissociates	the	indigenous	













Eastern	 countries	 that	 have	 witnessed	 revolutions	 still	 face	 huge	 impediments	 to	
establishing	a	civil	society:	Islamists	are	unaware	of	the	institutional	weaknesses	of	the	




contain	 hurdles.	 An	 intellectual	 infrastructure	must	 be	 established	 first	 and	 foremost.	
This	 is	 because	 intellectual	 dynamism	 has	 atrophied	 and	 has	 left	 the	 Muslim	 world	








it	 has,	 after	 all,	 yet	 to	 shape	 sound	 economic	 policies	 or	 lay	 the	 groundwork	 for	
institutions	that	might	stimulate	economic	growth.	This	is	why	studies	that	demonstrate	
a	causal	link	between	Islamic	beliefs,	behavioural	outcomes,	and	economic	performance	
are	 at	 best	 speculative.	 This	 paper	 also	 reconciles	 the	 two	 views	 in	 the	 literature	 on	
whether	 Islam	is	an	 impediment	or	a	 facilitator	of	economic	development	and	thus,	of	
growth.	We	absolve	Islamic	law	from	holding	back	the	progress	of	Muslims.	
If	the	Muslim	world	is	to	make	any	headway	out	of	its	current	morass,	Islamic	jurists	
must	 adopt	 a	 new	 approach,	 because	 for	 centuries	 they	 have	 been	 the	 de	 facto	
                                               






formulators	 of	 correct	 practice	 in	 Islam.	 They	must	 reformulate	 how	 they	 undertake	










safeguarding.	 Rather	 than	 making	 unilateral	 decisions,	 jurists	 should	 conduct	 a	 joint	
jurisprudential	interpretation	(ijtihād)	by	working	with	financial	economists	to:	develop	
institutions	 that	 enforce	 contracts,	 thus	 promoting	 property	 rights;	 foster	 good	
governance	and	provide	a	conducive	environment	for	private	initiative;	and	structure	a	
financial	infrastructure	that	promotes	growth.	
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